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How robust are value judgements of health inequality aversion? Testing for framing 
and cognitive effects 
 
Abstract  
Background: Empirical studies have found that members of the public are inequality averse 
and value health gains for disadvantaged groups with poor health many times more highly 
than gains for better off groups. However, these studies typically use abstract scenarios that 
involve unrealistically large reductions in health inequality, and face-to-face survey 
administration. It is not known how robust these findings are to more realistic scenarios or 
anonymous online survey administration.  
Methods: This study aimed to test the robustness of questionnaire estimates of inequality 
aversion by comparing the following: (1) small versus unrealistically large health inequality 
reductions; (2) population-level versus individual-level descriptions of health inequality 
reductions; (3) concrete versus abstract intervention scenarios; and (4) online versus face to 
face mode of administration.  Fifty-two members of the public participated in face-to-face 
discussion groups, while 83 members of the public completed an online survey. Participants 
were given a questionnaire instrument with different scenario descriptions for eliciting 
aversion to social inequality in health.  
Results: The median respondent was inequality averse under all scenarios. Scenarios 
involving small rather than unrealistically large health gains made little difference in terms of 
inequality aversion, as did population-level rather than individual-level scenarios.  However, 
the proportion expressing extreme inequality aversion fell 19 percentage points when 
considering a specific health intervention scenario rather than an abstract scenario, and was 
11-21 percentage points lower among online public respondents compared to the discussion 
group. 
Conclusions: Our study suggests that both concrete scenarios and online administration 
reduce the proportion expressing extreme inequality aversion but still yield median responses 
implying substantial health inequality aversion. 
 
Keywords 
Health Equity; Patient Preference; Value of Life; Social Values; Cost-effectiveness Analysis 
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Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
Health economists have developed questionnaires to measure how much people care about 
health inequality that may be considered unfair ³HTXLW\´relative to overall health 
(³efficiency´) and methods to analyse the data building on the social welfare function (SWF); 
see for example (Abasolo and Tsuchiya, 2004, Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2013, Dolan and 
Tsuchiya, 2011). The resulting estimates of health inequality aversion can be used in SWF-
based frameworks such as distributional cost-effectiveness analyses (DCEA) to help decision 
makers evaluate trade-offs between improving total health and reducing health inequality that 
may be considered unfair (Asaria et al., 2015). These questionnaires find that members of the 
public are highly averse to health inequality, implying that health gains to disadvantaged 
groups are worth many times more than gains to better off groups.  One study of members of 
the public in England, for example, estimated that the median respondent valued gains in life 
expectancy to the lowest social class 6.8 times more than gains to the highest social class 
(Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011). In fact, a large proportion of respondents in previous studies ± 
sometimes more than half ± expressed extreme aversion to health inequality to the extent that 
they violate monotonicity (Abasolo and Tsuchiya, 2004, Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2013).   
 
However, such findings are likely to be influenced by framing effects and other cognitive 
biases which are well known to psychologists (Kahneman, 2011) (McFadden, 2001) 
(Blumenthal-Barby and Krieger, 2014). For instance, a number of studies have evaluated how 
preferences are influenced by the presentation of outcomes, such as relative versus absolute 
levels/risk (Kragt and Bennett, 2012) (Malenka et al., 1993), gains (such as cases detected) 
versus losses (such as cases missed) (Kühberger, 1998) and probability of life versus 
probability of death (Kim et al., 2005). Moreover, recent research has found that both 
numerosity (i.e. units used in the choice experiments, such as days or years), and unitosity 
LHUHVSRQGHQWV¶DVVRFLDWLRQRIVPDOO units with small changes, and large units with large 
changes) can influence responses (Monga and Bagchi, 2012). However, such cognitive 
effects have not been thoroughly tested in the context of elicitation of health inequality 
aversion. 
 
Results that are skewed by cognitive biases induced by the study design may not be 
sufficiently reliable to inform public policy making, as they may not generalise from the 
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study setting to real world policy settings.  If the findings of academic work on health 
inequality aversion are to influence public policy decisions, then the direction and magnitude 
of potential cognitive biases need to be more thoroughly examined.   Of the many possible 
cognitive biases we could have examined, we have targeted those that appear to be the most 
policy-relevant in terms of assessing the generalizability of findings from study settings to 
real world policy settings. 
 
1.2 Aim 
This study aimed to assess how far a standard questionnaire instrument for eliciting aversion 
to social inequality in health is vulnerable to large cognitive effects that make a substantial 
difference to the estimated degree of health inequality aversion.  The four potential effects we 
examined were between: (1) realistic small health inequality reductions compared to 
unrealistically large health inequality reductions; (2) population-level compared to 
individual-level descriptions of health inequality reductions; (3) concrete compared to 
abstract intervention scenarios; and (4) online compared to face to face mode of 
administration.  Only the second of these LVD³IUDPLQJHIIHFW´LQWKHFODVVLFVense of using 
different ways of describing exactly the same decision problem.  However, all four can be 
WKRXJKWRIDV³cognitive´ effects, in the broad sense that they relate to issues of cognitive 
psychology and information-processing, as explained below.   
 
1.3 The four hypothesised cognitive effects 
(1) Small versus unrealistically large health inequality reductions:  Empirical studies typically 
use hypothetical scenarios that involve unrealistically large changes in health, such as 
hypothetical government programmes that will extend average life expectancy by several 
years and reduce inequality by a few years (Abasolo and Tsuchiya, 2004, Abásolo and 
Tsuchiya, 2013, Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011).  However, general population average health 
gains of this size are unrealistic in the short run, and unlikely to be achievable even with a 
PDVVLYHDQGVXVWDLQHG³RQFHLQJHQHUDWLRQ´programme of cross-government social, political 
and economic reform.  In practice, the public policy alternatives actually considered by social 
decision makers deliver much smaller average health benefits to the population.  For 
example, a case study of different ways of promoting uptake of the NHS Bowel Cancer 
Screening Programme among disadvantaged groups estimated incremental gains in general 
population average life expectancy of only a few hours (Asaria et al., 2015). This is because 
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but a few people will gain many years of life. It is not known how far findings from studies of 
unrealistically large gains are applicable to more realistic settings involving small health 
gains.  We hypothesise that using small health gains may substantially reduce the degree of 
inequality aversion. For instance, Olsen (2000) (Olsen, 2000) argues that D³PLQLPXP
WKUHVKROGTXDQWLW\´RIKHDOWKJDLQVPD\H[LVWEH\RQGZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOV¶HTXLW\SUHIHUHQFHV
take effect. Below this threshold, individuals may concentrate on the gains for some few. This 
was empirically demonstrated by Rodriguez-Miguez and Pinto-Prades (2002) (RodríguezǦMíguez and 
PintoǦPrades, 2002) who found that individuals prefer to concentrate on total health gains for smaller 
individual gains and express inequality aversion for larger individual gains. This may be because 
health inequality is a less familiar concept than total health, perceived at a less fine-grained 
level of detail.  So respondents may see small reductions in health inequality as worthless 
while still seeing small total health gains as worthwhile. 
 
(2) Population-level versus individual-level descriptions of health inequality reductions:  
Studies typically present health benefits in terms of the average change to individuals (e.g. 2 
years per person).  However, health benefits to a population can also be expressed in terms of 
total gains to the group (e.g. 2,000,000 person-years across a million people).  We 
hypothesise that when average benefits are small ± for example, a few hours per person ± 
then framing the same health benefits in terms of population totals may lead to larger 
inequality aversion than using average health benefits per person. A number of factors may 
influence preferences in this context. For instance, gains expressed in larger units (i.e. years) 
compared to smaller units (i.e. hours) (Monga and Bagchi, 2012) may incline respondents to 
prefer population-level scenarios. Respondents may not consider a small health gain in hours 
as worthwhile compared to a gain in years. Also, the perspective of health benefits (i.e. 
individual- or population-level) may result in different value judgments ± this was 
demonstrated by Gyrd-Hansen and Kristiansen (2008) (GyrdǦHansen and Kristiansen, 2008) 
who found that spread of health gains were more pronounced with the societal (or population-
level) perspective. Based on this, we hypothesise that using population totals may make the 
reductions in health inequality seem larger and more worthwhile. 
 
(3) Concrete versus abstract intervention scenarios:  Abstract scenarios are typically used, 
first, so that respondents do not bring their own unobserved cognitive ³EDJJDJH´WRWKH
interpretation of the scenarios, and second, so that findings can be applied to multiple policy 
contexts.  Arguably, however, respondents will always fill in the missing gaps in the scenario, 
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and abstract scenarios may be more susceptible to this problem than more tightly described 
concrete scenarios.  )XUWKHUPRUHLWLVQRWNQRZQKRZIDUSHRSOH¶V³abstract´YLHZVDERXW
KHDOWKMXVWLFHDUHWUDQVIHUDEOHWRWKHLU³FRQWH[W-VSHFLILF´YLHZVWhen more concrete 
scenarios are given, and people are encouraged to think more realistically rather than 
abstractly, this may have an effect (in either direction) on the level of inequality aversion they 
support. 
 
(4) Online versus face to face mode of administration:  
Typical surveys of inequality aversion have been conducted face to face which is time 
consuming and costly.  Increasingly, there is an interest in using online surveys to elicit social 
values of health (Shah et al., 2013); (Schwappach, 2003); (Rowen et al., 2016); (Linley and 
Hughes, 2013); (Norman et al., 2013); (Skedgel et al., 2015), partly because of the high 
speed, convenience and low cost of conducting the surveys though also because face to face 
administration may VXIIHUIURP³socially GHVLUDELOLW\´ bias (DeMaio, 1984).   
 
There is a growing literature investigating differences between face-to-face and online survey 
responses, both in surveys of population opinion and those involving trade-off exercises. For 
instance, in a randomised study involving person trade-off value judgments of health states, 
Damschroder et al (2005) (Damschroder et al., 2005) found that trade-off values did not 
differ between computer-based and face-to-face elicitations. Similar findings were observed 
by Mulhern et al (2013) (Mulhern et al., 2013) comparing computer-assisted personal 
interview (CAPI) versus face-to-face interviews. However, Norman et al (2010) (Norman et 
al., 2010) found that value judgments of EQ-5D health states differed by modes of 
administration with the computer-based group choosing more extreme responses and having 
larger standard deviations compared to the face-to-face group. Some of these differences in 
valuation of health states may be explained by difference in sample characteristics, level of 
effort or commitment to provide considered response, the level of support available to 
comprehend the task, as well as by social desirability bias (Bowling, 2005). Despite this 
growing literature, there is a dearth of studies investigating the influence of mode of 
administration on value judgments of health inequality aversion. 
We cannot determine a priori which mode of administration gives more appropriate results 
for use in policy making.  On the one hand, an online private environment is closer to the 
ballot box where citizens cast their secret vote without having to justify their choice.  On the 
other hand, online surveys may be less likely to reflect considered opinions, since questions 
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on social values require careful deliberation and are not topics that people are familiar with.  
Therefore, understanding the direction and magnitude of potential differences in findings 
between the two modes of administration is of interest.  We hypothesise that using online 
surveys may lead to smaller inequality aversion relative to face to face administration.  
 
1. Methods 
2.1 Questionnaire 
The basic questionnaire instrument used in this study (see Appendix 2) is adapted from 
(Abasolo and Tsuchiya, 2004, Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011).  It starts off by presenting 
background information about the current level of inequality in health between ³WKHULFKHVW
ILIWK´ of people in England, who on average live 74 years in full health (i.e. quality-adjusted 
life expectancy, QALE)DQG³WKHSRRUHVWILIWK´ZKRRQDYHUDJHOLYH\HDUVLQIXOOKHDOWK 
(Love-Koh et al., 2015). Both groups are made up of around 10 million individuals. 
 
The respondent is then presented with the choice experiment which consists of four questions 
(Q1-Q4), each with a different scenario or presentation (see below). Under each question 
(Q1-Q4), there are five pairs of hypothetical health programmes, A and B. Hence, by the end 
of the choice experiment, each respondent completes 20 paired choices, i.e. four questions 
(Q1-Q4) multiplied by five pairs of health programmes in each question. 
 
At each pair, respondents are asked to choose between programme A and B, or indicate 
indifference. These programmes show the health gains received by the richest and the poorest 
fifth of the population and the total health gain for the two groups. It is assumed that the 
remaining three fifths of the population are not affected by any of the hypothetical health 
programmes. In the first pair in each question, programmes A and B produce the same 
amount of total health benefit across the groups but benefit the two groups differently: 
programme B offers a reduction in health inequality compared with programme A.  In 
subsequent pairs, programme A remains the same, but the health gain to the worse off group 
in programme B becomes smaller and smaller ± and so both the reduction in health inequality 
and the gain in total health in programme B become smaller and smaller. Hence, programme 
B always reduces inequality but offers less total health, except for in the first pair where both 
programmes produce the same total health. The degree of inequality aversion is captured by 
observing the point at which a respondent is indifferent between the two programmes.  The 
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format of paired choices remains the same across the four questions (Q1-Q4); however, the 
scenario or presentation of the question changes (see below). 
 
Participants had to respond to all choice pairs to complete each task, irrespective of whether 
they were pro-rich or strict egalitarians, i.e. there was no quicker route to completing the 
questionnaire by taking one or the other position, and there was no exit option available. 
 
The first question (Q1) LVWKH³ODUJH-DYHUDJH´SUHVHQWDWLRQZKLFK corresponds to the format 
used in previous studies. In this question, the first pair presents programme A giving a 7-year 
gain in life in full health to the richest fifth and a 3-year gain to the poorest fifth; and 
programme B giving a 3-year gain to the richest fifth, and a 7-year gain to the poorest fifth.  
In the subsequent four pairs, the health gains in programme A and the health gain to the 
richest in programme B are fixed, while the health gain to the poorest in programme B 
decreases gradually from 6 years to 3 years. Appendix 2 reproduces all questions in full.   
 
All subsequent questions use the same background inequality across the richest fifth and the 
poorest fifth, and the same ratios of health gains (but scaled down proportionately).  In the 
second question, the health gains are small and measured in hours per head.  In the first pair, 
programme A gives a 7-hour gain in life in full health to the richest fifth and a 3-hour gain to 
the poorest fifth, while programme B gives a 3-hour gain to the richest fifth and a 7-hour gain 
to the poorest fifth.  The gain for the poorest group under programme B at the fifth pair is 3 
hours.  TKXVWKLVUHSUHVHQWVWKH³VPDOO-average´presentation.   
 
The third queVWLRQUHSUHVHQWVWKH³VPDOO-SRSXODWLRQ´presentation.  In the first pair, 
programme A gives a 7,000-person-year gain in life in full health to the richest fifth as a 
group (consisting of 10 million people) and a 3,000-person-year gain to the poorest fifth as a 
group, while programme B gives a 3,000-person-year gain to the richest fifth and a 7,000-
person-year gain to the poorest fifth.  The gain for the poorest group under programme B at 
the fifth pair is 3,000 person-years.  Note that, since each quintile is assumed to consist of 10 
million individuals, 7,000 person-years amounts to 0.0007 years per head, which is 
equivalent to 6.132 hours per head.  We use 7 hours in the second question instead of 6.132 
hours in order to maintain the 7:3 ratio of benefits across the richest and the poorest. 
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The fourth question (used only in face to face mode of administration) introduces a more 
³FRQFUHWHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´to the health inequality and the health programme, using a topic taken 
from (Asaria et al., 2014).  A presentation is given on the different take up rates of bowel 
cancer screening by income groups, followed by a description of two health programmes on 
reminders to participate in screening: one that sends impersonal reminders to all eligible 
individuals (benefitting the richest fifth more), and another that sends personalised and GP-
endorsed reminder letters to individuals in deprived areas who have a lower take-up rate 
(benefitting the poorest fifth more). Besides the concrete context, this question is exactly the 
same as the third question. 
Before completing these four questions, respondents completed a set of questions on attitudes 
to the welfare state and income redistribution (Park et al., 2013). 
 
2.2 Data collection 
There were two samples.  One was D³discussion´VDPSOHZKHUHPHPEHUVRIWKHpublic were 
invited to participate in a ³FLWL]HQV¶SDQHO´ event involving: presentations by facilitators to 
introduce the questionnaire; facilitated discussions in groups of five or six; individual 
completion of the questionnaire; sharing the responses within the group; and opportunities to 
change the questionnaire responses.  Two ³FLWL]HQV¶SDQHO´ events were held with two 
different subsamples of participants: a 5-hour event including lunch, on Saturday 21st 
September 2013 (n = 29), in the City of York; and a 3-hour event with the same format and 
question order, but excluding lunch and post-lunch tasks not reported in this paper, on 
Saturday 22nd February 2014 (n = 23), at the University of York.  Payments of £70 and £30 
were offered per participant in the first and second events, respectively. 
 
The participants for the citizens¶SDQHOZHUHUHFUXLWHGthrough: (a) advertisements in a 
monthly free local magazine (Your Local Link) distributed to all homes across York (July and 
August, 2013); and (b) 810 leaflets distributed door to door in 10 of the most deprived streets 
in York.  A quota was set so that each of 8 age/sex groups had a capacity for three to four 
participants, including one from a postcode with higher deprivation.  Occupation information 
was also collected at the screening stage. Those with university academic/research jobs were 
excluded because they may have had previous training or exposure to handling similar tasks 
involving trade-offs between competing social values, and therefore may not have the same 
cognitive biases as the general public.  
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The second sample was DQ³RQOLQH´VDPSOH which included 83 respondents. The first three 
questions above (large-average; small-average; small-population) were posted online (hosted 
by Smart-Survey).  The survey was publicised on social media, the York Local Link magazine 
above and the website of the Centre for Health Economics at the University of York.  
Respondents could complete the survey anonymously, or leave their contact details.  No 
remuneration was offered for taking part. To make the discussion and online groups 
comparable, we again excluded those with university academic/research jobs from the online 
sample using information on respondent occupation. 
 
Research ethics approval for the study was obtained from the University of York Health 
Sciences Research Governance Committee. 
 
2.3 Analysis 
Prior to pooling across the two discussion group samples, we compared their results against 
each other and found no differences in the basic pattern of findings in terms of the level of 
inequality aversion. 
 
Each of the main questions allowed us to distinguish five different types of value judgement, 
which correspond to five different principles of health justice (see Table 1).  At each pair, 
respondents have three choices: programme A (A), programme B (B), or indifference (=).    
The ³SUR-ULFK´$$$$$ always choose programme A while the ³KHDOWKPD[LPLVHUV´ 
(=AAAA) are indifferent in the first pair but choose A subsequently.  Collectively, we label 
these first two t\SHVDV³QRQ-HJDOLWDULDQ´ 
 
Table 1: Types of value judgement about health justice [about here] 
 
2XUWKLUGW\SHRISUHIHUHQFHLVWKH³WUDGHU´RU³ZHLJKWHGSULRULWDULDQ´%;;;$ZKR
chooses B in the first pair, then switches to A at some point (indicated by the XXX in the 
middle ± see below)7KHWHUP³ZHLJKWHGSULRULWDULDQ´PHDQVSHRSOHZKR give priority to the 
worse off but not exclusively. Hence, they will not violate monotonicity (any increase in 
individual health will result in an increase in social welfare, other things being equal). Strictly 
speaking, a respondent who switches to programme A only in the final pair (BBBBA) might 
EH³OH[LPLQ´UDWKHUWKDQ³ZHLJKWHGSULRULWDULDQ´, i.e. they give almost exclusive priority to the 
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health of the worse off group, but are willing to use a second principle such as health 
PD[LPLVDWLRQDVD³WLH-EUHDNHU´ 
 
The next category of respondents is maximin (BBBB=), who give fully exclusive priority to 
the health of the worst off by choosing programme B in the first four pairs but becoming 
indifferent in the final pair.  This preference can be represented by the limit of a standard 
social welfare function as the inequality aversion parameter tends to infinity.  Finally, we 
label respondents who prefer programme B in the fiQDOSDLUDV³VWULFWHJDOLWDULDQV´%%%%%
This preference violates monotonicity and so cannot be represented using standard 
monotonicity-respecting social welfare functions.  Collectively, we label these last two types 
DV³VWURQJHJDOLWDULDQV´ 
 
Within tKH³ZHLJKWHGSULRULWDULDQ´W\SH (BXXXA), we can distinguish seven distinct 
response categories by breaking up the XXX in the middle.  The first of these (BAAAA) 
represents a trade-off point of 6.5 (since the respondent switches at some point between 7 and 
6 units of health benefit).  The second sub-category (B=AAAA) represents a trade-off point 
of 6 (since the respondent is indifferent at 6 units of health benefit), and so on down in half 
units to the seventh sub-category (BBBBA) which represents a trade-off point of 3.5.  
6LPLODUO\WKH³SUR-ULFK´DQG³KHDOWKPD[LPLVDWLRQ´FDWHJRULHVUHSUHVHQWWUDGH-off points of  
>DQGUHVSHFWLYHO\DQGWKH³PD[LPLQ´DQG³VWULFWHJDOLWDULDQ´FDWHJRULHVUHSUHVHQWWUDGH-
off points of 3 and <3, respectively.  We thus obtain 11 separate response categories which 
can be ranked in order from the least egalitarian (>7) to the most egalitarian (<3). 
 
The five value judgments discussed above can be represented as iso-welfare curves using the 
Atkinson Index (Figure 1). The x-axis and y-axis show the QALE in the richest and poorest 
fifths respectively. The initial QALE before the programme is 62 years and 74 years for the 
richest and poorest fifth respectively which would increase to 65 and 81 years respectively if 
programme A was implemented. The health distributions resulting from different value 
judgements are represented as diamonds in figure 1 while preference functions are 
represented as iso-curves. 
Figure 1: Iso-Welfare Curves Representing Response Categories [about here]  
These response categories can be converted into health inequality aversion parameter 
estimates by fitting a social welfare function through the two outcomes where the respondent 
is indifferent, and then solving for the inequality aversion parameter.  Our aim in this paper is 
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to perform methodological tests of reliability rather than to estimate a health inequality 
aversion parameter for policy purposes.  However, we compute implied weights to give 
readers insight into the magnitude of the inequality aversion parameters and to help those 
who wish to compare our findings with those of other studies.  The appendix 1 includes a 
³ORRNXSWDEOH´ along with the calculations underpinning the conversion 
process.
 
To examine (1) small versus unrealistically large health inequality reductions, the first (large-
individual) and second (small-individual) questions are used, within each of the two samples 
(citizens¶SDQHODQGRQOLQH.  For (2) population-level versus individual-level descriptions of 
health inequality reductions, the second (small-individual) and third (small-population) 
questions are used, within each sample (citizens¶SDQHODQGRQOLQH.  To explore (3) concrete 
versus abstract intervention scenarios, the third (small-population) and fourth (concrete) 
questions are usedZLWKLQWKHFLWL]HQV¶SDQHOVDPSOH.  And finally, to examine (4) online 
versus discussion group mode of administration, the first, second, and third questions from 
WKHFLWL]HQV¶SDQHOVDPSOH are compared with the corresponding questions in the online 
sample.  In each case, the cumulative distribution across the 11 ordered response categories 
(from less to more egalitarian) are compared using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  In addition, 
the proportions of non-egalitarian (pro-rich and health maximising) and strong egalitarian 
(maximin and strict egalitarian) responses are compared using the chi-square test. 
 
2. Results 
3.1 The sample 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the discussion group and on-line survey respondents  
[about here] 
The first two samples had similar age and gender characteristics. Overall, the discussion 
sample was slightly more affluent than the other two samples.  Respondents in both the two 
online groups were slightly more likely to have egalitarian social attitudes than respondents 
in the discussion group.   
 
3.2 The distribution of switching point by question and by sample 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses across the five principles of health justice, 
inferred from the switching points by question and by sample.   
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Figure 2: Inferred principles of health justice by question and sample design [about here] 
 
 
Each stacked bar indicates the proportion of responses ranging from ³pro-ULFK´on the left end 
to ³strict egalitarian´ on the right end.  As can be seen, in the first three questions, the median 
UHVSRQGHQWLV³VWURQJHJDOLWDULDQ´LH³PD[LPLQ´RU³VWULFWHJDOLWDULDQ´in the discussion 
sample but is DOZD\V³ZHLJKWHGSULRULWDULDQ´LQthe online sample.  However, the median 
respondent in the discussion group sample shifts WR³ZHLJKWHGSULRULWDULDQ´LQWKHFRQFUHWH
question (this question was not used on the online sample). 
 
Table 3 presents the trade-off points of the median respondent and the implied equity weight 
to the poorest fifth compared with the richest fifth. In general, the discussion group had lower 
point estimates of median trade-off points; however, the confidence intervals (CI) of the 
trade-off points in the discussion and online groups always included the strong egalitarian 
trade-off point (3.0 or <3), and therefore the CI for the implied weights were undefined.  
 
Table 3: Median response in different groups, with 95% confidence interval in brackets 
[about here] 
 
Table 4: Non-parametric statistical tests: all respondents [about here] 
 
Table 4 shows the results of statistical tests for the hypotheses.  We adopt a conservative 
approach throughout and always reported two-sided tests. We use labels D and O for 
discussion and online groups respectively. Hence, D1 represents Q1 in the discussion group, 
and so forth. 
 
Our first hypothesis was that small gains (small-average, Q2; and small-population Q3) 
would yield less egalitarian responses than unrealistically large gains (Q1).  We found that 
the large-average and small-population questions gave similar results within both the 
discussion (D1-D3) and online samples (O1-O3).  On the other hand, responses were less 
egalitarian in the small-average question compared with the large-average question.  
However, this difference was not statistically significant in the online sample (O1-O2) and 
only just reached statistical significance in one of the three tests within the discussion group 
sample (D1-D2).  Furthermore, the size of the difference was never large in any of the large 
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versus small gains comparisons ± the largest difference was a 9.2 percentage point difference 
in the proportion expressing strong egalitarian views (D1-D2).  Overall, therefore, there was 
no clear evidence of a substantial and systematic effect. 
Our second hypothesis was that responses would be more egalitarian under population-level 
(Q2) rather than individual-level (Q3) descriptions of the small gains question.  The pattern 
of responses was in this direction within the discussion group (D2-D3), but did not reach 
statistical significance in any of the tests.  Furthermore, there was no such pattern of 
responses within the online sample (O2-O3).  Again, therefore, there was no evidence of an 
effect. 
 
Our third hypothesis was that responses might differ (in either direction) between concrete 
(D4) and abstract (D3) scenarios.  In all three tests we found that discussion group sample 
responses were significantly more egalitarian under the abstract rather than concrete scenario, 
providing clear support for the third hypothesis. 
 
Finally, our fourth hypothesis was that discussion group respondents (D) would be more 
egalitarian than online respondents (O).  This was indeed the general pattern of responses, 
with a substantially larger proportion of the discussion group sample (between 11 and 21 
percentage points) expressing strong egalitarian responses in all three questions.  However, 
only the small-population question (D3-O3) reached statistical significance.  So this provides 
some albeit weak support for our fourth hypothesis. 
 
Figure 3 gives a visual representation of the rank-sum test, using the example of the large-
average question comparing the discussion versus online samples (D1 vs O1).  Along the 
horizontal axis are the 11 ranked points at which respondents can be indifferent between the 
two programmes. The vertical axis represents the cumulative proportion of respondents who 
have switched to the less egalitarian programme A by that point.  The stronger the inequality 
aversion, the lower the cumulative curve.  In Figure 3, the cumulative curves are similar up to 
4 but then the online group rises more rapidly showing a smaller proportion of respondents 
JLYLQJWKH³VWURQJHJDOLWDULDQ´UHVSRQVHVRI³PD[LPLQ´DQG³VWULFWHJDOLWDULDQ 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of trade-off points for the large-average question, by mode 
of administration (D1 vs O1) [about here] 
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Figure 4 shows a cumulative rank comparison within the discussion group sample, comparing 
abstract and concrete versions of the small-population presentation (D3 vs D4).  This time the 
cuUYHVVWDUWWRGLYHUJHHDUO\RQZLWKDKLJKHUSURSRUWLRQRI³SUR-ULFK´DQG³KHDOWK
PD[LPLVHU´UHVSRQVHVXQGHUWKHFRQFUHWHTXHVWLRQIUDPH 
 
Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of trade-off points for the small-population vs concrete 
question for the discussion group (D3 vs D4) [about here] 
 
 
 
4. Discussion 
A number of studies have attempted to quantify societal value judgements about equity, 
including value judgements about severity and burden of illness, end of life, and health 
inequality aversion (Rowen et al., 2016), (Linley and Hughes, 2013), (Shah et al., 2013, 
Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011). While these studies elicit public views, most do not evaluate the 
effect of different scenario presentations and mode of administration that may influence the 
final results.  This paper contributes towards filling this gap in the context of health inequality 
aversion, by performing experimental tests contrasting: (1) small instead of unrealistically 
large health inequality reductions; (2) population-level instead of individual-level 
descriptions of health inequality reductions; (3) concrete instead of abstract intervention 
scenarios; and (4) online instead of face to face mode of administration.   
 
We find no clear evidence of systematic and substantial effects of small versus unrealistically 
large health inequality reduction scenarios (1) or population-level descriptions (2).  However, 
we do find clear evidence of an inequality aversion-reducing concrete scenario effect (3), and 
weak evidence of an inequality aversion-reducing online mode of administration effect (4).  
Within our discussion group sample, the proportion of non-egalitarians rose substantially and 
significantly when using a concrete rather than abstract scenario (by 12 percentage points), 
and the proportion expressing extreme inequality aversion fell substantially and significantly 
(by 19 percentage points).  Finally, respondents were substantially more likely to give strict 
egalitarian responses in our discussion group sample compared with our online sample (by 
between 11 and 21 percentage points), although this pattern of findings only reached 
statistical significance for one of the three questions.  So we conclude cautiously that there is 
only weak evidence of an inequality aversion-reducing online mode of administration effect.    
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Despite these three effects, however, median responses always implied substantial health 
inequality aversion and the implied weight to health gains in the worst off group never fell 
below 2.57 in any of our experimental conditions or sub-groups. 
 
One possible explanation for the concrete scenario effect is that the intervention in question 
DUHPLQGHUOHWWHUWRSURPRWHXSWDNHRIERZHOFDQFHUVFUHHQLQJZDVDQ³DJHQWLF´
LQWHUYHQWLRQWRSURPRWHLQGLYLGXDOKHDOWKEHKDYLRXUFKDQJHUDWKHUWKDQD³VWUXFWXUDO´
intervention to alter the social determinants of health³$JHQWLF´LQWHUYHQWLRQVPD\PDNH
concepts of individual responsibility for health behaviour and outcomes more salient in 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶PLQGVWKXVUHGXFLQJDYHUVLRQWRKHDOWKLQHTXDOLW\,IVRDEVWUDFWVFHQDULRVPD\
tend to produce higher estimates of public concern for reducing health inequality than 
concrete scenarios based on ³DJHQWLF´LQWHUYHQWLRQV 
 
Finally, the mode of administration effect may VXJJHVWD³VRFLDOGHVLUDELOLW\ELDV´ZKHUHE\
face-to-face administration tends to elicit pro-HJDOLWDULDQ³6XQGD\EHVW´UHVSRQVHVOn the 
other hand, the (slightly) less egalitarian social attitudes reported by the discussion group 
sample suggests that this may be because face-to-face discussion provides a better 
opportunity for careful deliberation. Either way, it is important that decision makers are 
aware of the nature and magnitude of potential biases, so that they can appropriately assess 
and interpret evidence about public views. 
 
One of the considerations in inequality aversion surveys is the choice of terminology used to 
describe the socioeconomic groups being compared. Our survey describes these groups as the 
µULFKHVW¶DQGµSRRUHVW¶ILIWK7KLVLVERWKWHFKQLFDOO\FRUUHFWDQGHDV\WRXQGHUVWDQGIRUWKH
participants. Other terms such as most/least deprived and most advantaged/disadvantaged 
have been used in the literature. However, while the choice of terminology may influence the 
point of indifference within a scenario description, it is unlikely that the effects found in our 
study between scenario descriptions and between modes of administration may be due to the 
choice of this terminology. 
 
We note that a number of valuation tools exist to elicit equity-efficiency trade-offs (Gu et al 
2015); these may or may not provide different estimates of inequality aversion. However, the 
cognitive effects identified in our study are also likely to be relevant to other valuation tools. 
A potential weakness of the questionnaire instrument used in this study is that the visual aids 
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used focus on health gains, and not the final distributions of health.  In this respect, this study 
may be criticised for favouring gain egalitarianism over outcome egalitarianism (Tsuchiya 
and Dolan, 2009).  However, since identical framing with a fixed ratio of gains has been 
maintained across all questions, we expect this potential effect to cancel out in the 
comparisons across pairs of questions that we carried out. Another potential criticism of the 
study may be that respondents may favour the first (or the left hand side) option over the 
second alternative in pair-ZLVHFRPSDULVRQVFRPPRQO\NQRZQDVµUHVSRQVHRUGHUHIIHFW¶ 
similarly, the titration sequence in which questions are presented (compared to random order 
presentation) may influence choice behaviour. However, Abasolo and Tsuchiya (2013) 
specifically evaluated both effects and found no evidence of significant difference due to 
response order or titration sequence. 
 
Another potential criticism is that the order of questions was not randomised which may 
LQIOXHQFHYDOXHMXGJPHQWVGXHWRD³OHDUQLQJHIIHFW´+RZHYHUZHGLGQRWILQGDFRQVLVWHQW
pattern of responses across questions to suggest such effect. Finally, we acknowledge that the 
sample size of this study is relatively modest, although large enough to detect at least two 
statistically significant effects. As a suggestion for future research in this area, we 
recommend that the biases considered in this study should be investigated in larger samples. 
Another consideration in this study is the generalisability of our findings from a small sample 
to the general population. We think that while the absolute level of inequality aversion may 
vary between population groups, the cognitive effects found in this study are likely to hold 
true in other settings. However, further research is needed to investigate these biases in larger 
and more diverse samples. 
Overall, however, the basic finding of substantial health inequality aversion is surprisingly 
robust.  There was no substantial or clearly significant effect of using small rather than 
unrealistically large health gains, or using population-level rather than individual-level 
presentations.  And although a concrete scenario and online mode of administration reduced 
the proportion of respondents expressing infinite inequality aversion, median responses in all 
the variations explored still displayed a substantial degree of health inequality aversion.   
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Figure 1: Iso-Welfare Curves Representing Response Categories 
 
21 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Inferred principles of health justice by question 
and sample design * ** 
* Pro-rich (AAAAA); health maximiser (=AAAA); weighted prioritarian (BXXXA); Maximiner (BBBB=); Strict 
egalitarian (BBBBB) 
** The vertical line indicates the location of the median respondent 
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Wilcoxon rank sum test: p = 0.181
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of trade-off points for the large-average 
question, by mode of administration (D1 vs O1)* ** 
* The trade off point represents the point at which the respondent would be indifferent 
between the less egalitarian programme A, in terms of the gain in years of life in full health to 
the poorest fifth in Programme B 
** In terms of our five principles of health justice, < 3 is "strict egalitarian", 3 is "maximin", 3.5 
through to 6.5 are "weighted prioritarian", 7 is "health maximisation" and 7+ is "pro-rich". 
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of trade-off points for the small-
population vs concrete question for the discussion group (D3 vs D4) 
Wilcoxon rank sum test: p = 0.001
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Table 1: Types of value judgement about health justice 
 Rank  
(from pro-rich to 
strict egalitarian) 
Types of view about health justice Trade-off point 
1 Pro-rich (AAAAA) >7 
2 Health maximiser (=AAAA) 7.0 
3 Weighted prioritarian (BAAAA) 6.5 
4 Weighted prioritarian (B=AAA) 6.0 
5 Weighted prioritarian (BBAAA) 5.5 
6 Weighted prioritarian (BB=AA) 5.0 
7 Weighted prioritarian (BBBAA) 4.5 
8 Weighted prioritarian (BBB=A) 4.0 
9 Weighted prioritarian (BBBBA) 3.5 
10 Maximin (BBBB=) 3.0 
11 Strict egalitarian (BBBBB) <3 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the discussion group and on-line survey respondents 
  
Discussion group  
(N = 52) 
Online group    
(N = 83) 
Baseline  Statistic n Statistic n 
Male (%) 40.4% 21 32.5% 27 
Age (%)     
Under 18 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 
18-34 21.2% 11 18.1% 15 
35-49 13.5% 7 15.7% 13 
50-64 38.5% 20 42.2% 35 
65+ 26.9% 14 24.1% 20 
Mean deprivation quintile (mean) 
(1 = most deprived; 5 = most affluent) 3.71 51 3.17 83 
Social attitude statements* (mean) 
(1= strongly agree; 5= strongly disagree)     
The creation of the welfare state is one of 
Britain's proudest achievements. 1.42 52 1.36 82 
Government should redistribute income 
from the better-off to those who are less 
well off. 
2.86 51 2.05 82 
*1 suggests most egalitarian and 5 suggests most non-egalitarian 
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Table 3: Median response in different groups, with 95% confidence interval in brackets 
Question Discussion Online  
 Trade-off point Implied weight Trade-off point Implied weight 
Abstract-large-average <3 
(3 to <3) 
Undefined 3.5  
(4.5 to <3) 
6.8 
(2.6 to undefined) 
Abstract-small-average 3  
(3.5 to <3) 
Undefined 
(6.8 to undefined) 
3.5  
(4.5 to <3) 
6.8 
(2.6 to undefined) 
Abstract-small-population <3 
(3 to <3) 
Undefined 3.5  
(4 to 3) 
6.8 
(3.7 to undefined) 
Concrete-small-population 3.5 
(4 to 3) 
6.8 
(3.7 to undefined) 
- - 
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Table 4: Non-parametric statistical tests: all respondents 
 Difference in % that 
are strong egalitarian* 
Difference in % that 
are non-egalitarians* 
Wilcoxon equality test ۆ 
First hypothesis: large vs small health gains    
Large-average vs small-average question (D1 ± D2)+ +9.2% (p = 0.377) -5.4% (p = 0.225) z = 1.964; p = 0.0496 
Large-average vs small-population question (D1 ± D3) -0.8% (p = 0.937) -0.2% (p = 0.937) z = 0.458; p = 0.647 
Large-average vs small-average question (O1 ± O2) +2.46% (p =0.772) -5.1% (p =0.167) z = 1.915; p = 0.056 
Large-average vs small-population question (O1 ± O3) +2.6% (p =0.765) -3.8% (p =0.281) z = 0.979; p = 0.328 
Second hypothesis: small-average vs small-population    
Small-average vs small-population question (D2 ± D3) -9.9% (p = 0.350) +5.2% (p = 0.271) z = -1.313; p = 0.189 
Small-average vs small-population question (O2 ± O3) +0.1% (p =0.991) +1.4% (p =0.767) z = 0.311; p = 0.756 
Third hypothesis: abstract vs concrete scenario 
   
Small-population vs concrete question (D3 ± D4) +18.6% (p = 0.080) -11.6% (p = 0.049) z = 3.244; p = 0.001 
Fourth hypothesis: discussion group vs online    
Large-average question (D1 ± O1) +17.3% (p =0.059) -0.6% (p = 0.838) z =1.338; p = 0.181 
Small-average question (D2 ± O2) +10.6% (p =0.292) -0.3% (p = 0.954) z = 0.987; p = 0.324 
Small-population question (D3 ± O3) +20.7% (p =0.036) -4.1% (p = 0.329) z = 2.022; p = 0.043 
 
* Strong egalitarians = maximiner or strict egalitarian; Non-egalitarians = pro-rich or health maximisers. p-values provided for test of equality of proportions.  
* Negative sign indicates less egalitarian (or non-egalitarian in the third column) in the first group compared to the second group, and vice versa.  
ۆ:LOFR[RQrank-sum test was used for unmatched data and signed-rank test was used for matched data. Null hypothesis: two samples are from populations 
with the same distribution. 
+D = discussion group; O = online group; 1 = large-average; 2 = small-average; 3 = small-population; 4 = concrete 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: 
 
Estimating the inequality aversion parameter 
To estimate health inequality aversion parameters, one can use a symmetric social welfare 
function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES): 
 
where W is the level of health related social welfare; Hi LVWKHOHYHORI\HDUVRIOLIHLQ
full health for population group i, where i =  R for the richest fifth and i =  P for the poorest 
fifth; and r -LVWKHLQHTXDOLW\DYHUVLRQSDUDPHWHUWhen a respondent is indifferent 
between two programmes A and B, these two outcomes are on the same social welfare 
contour.  At the mid-point of A and B, the gradient of the contour is: 
 
which is also (approximately) equal to: 
 
From this relationship, a unique value of r can be obtained, either mathematically (Abasolo 
and Tsuchiya, 2004) or by using the solve tool in a spread sheet (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2011).  
Once the value of r is obtained, the implied equity weight given to a marginal improvement 
in the health of the poorest fifth relative to the health of the richest fifth can be calculated 
from the marginal rate of substitution: 
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Appendix Table 1: Calculation table to estimate the inequality aversion parameter of a symmetric social welfare function with constant elasticity of 
substitution for the large-average question (source: Abasolo and Tsuchiya 2004) 
 
  
Types of preference 
(choice behaviour) 
Trade-off 
point 
QALE* of the 
rich (Prog A) 
QALE of the 
rich (Prog B) 
QALE of the 
poor (Prog A) 
QALE of the 
poor (Prog B) 
Inequality 
aversion 
parameter 
Implied 
weight 
1 Pro-rich (AAAAA) >7 81 77 65 Undefined [**] [**]  
2 Health maximiser (=AAAA) 7.0 81 77 65 69 -1.00 1.00 
3 Weighted prioritarian (BAAAA) 6.5 81 77 65 68.5 -0.21 1.15 
4 Weighted prioritarian (B=AAA) 6.0 81 77 65 68 0.67 1.34 
5 Weighted prioritarian (BBAAA) 5.5 81 77 65 67.5 1.67 1.60 
6 Weighted prioritarian (BB=AA) 5.0 81 77 65 67 2.86 1.98 
7 Weighted prioritarian (BBBAA) 4.5 81 77 65 66.5 4.34 2.57 
8 Weighted prioritarian (BBB=A) 4.0 81 77 65 66 6.40 3.70 
9 Weighted prioritarian (BBBBA) 3.5 81 77 65 65.5 9.87 6.85 
10 Maximin (BBBB=) 3.0 81 77 65 65 Undefined Undefined 
11 Strict egalitarian (BBBBB) <3 81 77 65 Undefined Undefined Undefined 
 
* QALE: Quality adjusted life expectancy 
** Assuming symmetry, the implied preference is inequality seeking. 
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